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Does Corporate Governance Affect The Corporate Financial Sustainability? Panel Empirical Evidence of an Emerging Capital Market

Abstract

This study examines how corporate governance practices affect the financial sustainability of manufacturing companies in Bangladesh. The study employed a dynamic panel data auto-regressive methodology within the framework of a two-step system generalized method of moments (2-SGMM) estimation technique. Financial sustainability is shown by operational self-sufficiency (OSS), financial self-sufficiency (FSS), return on equity (ROE), and return on assets (ROA), in that order. Using data from 109 companies over a decade, the research found that board size positively impacts financial self-sufficiency, while board diversity improves overall financial sustainability. However, board meeting frequency and independence, as well as audit committee size, have a limited impact on financial performance. The study also revealed that CEO compensation negatively affects financial sustainability, while CEO tenure has a positive influence. The findings suggest that strengthening corporate governance practices, especially by increasing board diversity and promoting independent directors, can enhance the financial health of manufacturing firms in Bangladesh.

1.0 Introduction

At the turn of the 21st century, discussions about corporate financial sustainability began. Bangladesh, a rapidly developing South Asian country, heavily relies on its manufacturing sector to address economic challenges and foster sustainable growth. Although relatively new, the concepts of corporate financial sustainability and corporate governance are gaining traction within Bangladesh's manufacturing industry. An extensive array of initiatives regarding corporate financial sustainability is being actively pursued by the manufacturing sector in Bangladesh. The sustainable business practices of corporate financial sustainability have garnered global attention. Institutional sustainability necessitates the financial sustainability of a manufacturing organization (Bayai & Ikhide, 2016). Elkington (1998) and Hussain et al. (2020) introduced an idea that seeks to harmonize the three facets of sustainability in society, environment, and economy within the context of business. Sustainability has emerged as an essential concern for nations worldwide (Kocmanová et al., 2016; Pavláková Doİekalová et al.,2015; Salvioni et al., 2016). Three primary dimensions constitute corporate sustainability: economic, social, and environmental (Zabolotnyy & Wasilewski, 2019). Scholarly discourse in the field of corporate finance has predominantly focused on the economic or financial dimensions of corporate sustainability, even though all three pillars are of equal significance (Gleißner et al., 2022). Organizations that prioritize long-term sustainability are obligated to generate economic value (Salvioni et al., 2016). Additionally, the corporate financial sustainability structures of numerous multinational corporations have been severely impacted by scandals (Adegboye

et al., 2020). Scholars have consistently highlighted the negative effects of scandals, such as those involving Enron, Worldcom, Artur Andersen, Bhopal, Exxon Valdez, and others, in numerous discussion forums, which demand immediate resolution (Lenssen et al., 2014; Mahmood et al., 2018). The capacity of a business to effectively manage its operations while meeting the demands and expectations of its stakeholders and consumers over an extended period is referred to as corporate financial sustainability (Kim et al., 2018; Kinde, 2012; Kong et al., 2023). Financial sustainability is defined by Bowman (2011) and Laskar and Gopal Maji (2018) as the ability of a business to preserve and expand its financial resources for an extended period. Moreover, an essential element of financial sustainability pertains to the capacity and dependability of an institution to function separately in terms of its finances, all the while safeguarding its governance framework and operations (Adeyemi, 2019; Carolina et al., 2020; Laskar & Gopal Maji, 2018). Consequently, the ultimate objective of corporate governance is to ensure that organizations achieve financial sustainability (Bonn & Fisher, 2011; Bowman, 2011; Formentini & Taticchi, 2016; Helms, 2006; Tjahjadi et al., 2021; Zarefar et al., 2022). Due to the underperformance of manufacturing companies, often caused by ineffective internal controls, inadequate risk management, and weak leadership, it is crucial to implement robust corporate governance structures and improve financial sustainability. (Adeyemi, 2019; Bonn & Fisher, 2011; Farber, 2005; Hashim & Hassan, 2017; Uchenna, 2020). Corporate governance includes the interconnections among various stakeholders, including shareholders, management, the board of directors, and other relevant parties (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Gul et al., 2003; Kusi et al., 2018; Salvioni et al., 2016; Zarefar et al., 2022). Hence, in seeking financial sustainability, corporate governance emerges as an effective system (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Eppel, 1999; Farber, 2005; Hashim & Hassan, 2017; Helms, 2006; Shanikat & Abbadi, 2011; Tjahjadi et al., 2021). As corporate governance in organizations becomes proactive, it fosters an ideal corporate environment that deters managers and others from prioritizing their own interests (Abdullah & Nasir, 2004; Shanikat & Abbadi, 2011). Corporate governance frameworks function as a Preventive approach, providing guidance to corporations on how to optimize the financial sustainability (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Epps & Cereola, 2008; Judge et al., 2003; Kocmanová et al., 2016). Financial sustainability is defined as the capacity of manufacturing firms to operate and remain financially self-sufficient without jeopardizing their governance mechanisms or operations (Adeyemi, 2019; Badin & Dabor, 2015; Suharyono et al., 2023). The manufacturing industry is widely acknowledged for its significant contribution to the financial resources and economic progress of a country. Dollar inflows, exports of goods, and remittances earnings constitute its principal sources of income. The country relies heavily on due to the significant rise in foreign reserves they generate (Rahman & Tania, 2021). "Without a doubt, the manufacturing sector in Bangladesh will endure a challenging period, and it has struggled to survive for the past few years due to events such as the Russia-Ukraine war` and the COVID-19 outbreak. As a result of rising inflation, the majority of manufacturing companies are experiencing difficulties, including loan defaults, decreased exports, and increased costs of importing raw materials and cost of the rising price of electricity" (Nadiruzzaman et al., 2021). Due to its enduring poor performance stemming from inadequate risk management, weak management, and ineffective internal control

mechanisms, MFS has been driven to establish a strong corporate governance framework and enhance its financial sustainability (Uchenna, 2020; Adeyemi, 2019; Eppel, 1999; Lenssen et al., 2014). The establishment of a corporate governance mechanism in MFS is primarily driven by this concern, which aims to enhance the sector's financial sustainability (Formentini & Taticchi, 2016; Hussain et al., 2020; Zahid et al., 2020). The purpose of this research paper is to illustrate the influence of corporate governance on the financial sustainability of manufacturing firms. This is because in the absence of financial sustainability, a company would be unable to meet customer demands, cover operational costs, produce lower net earnings, and cannot attain its objectives of economic and social sustainability. In Bangladesh, not a single study has been conducted on the topic of corporate governance effects on financial sustainability and the lack of empirical evidence regarding the relationship between corporate governance and the financial sustainability of MFS in Bangladesh serves as the catalyst for conducting this study. The four variables, Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS), and Financial Self Sufficiency (FSS), that are used to measure financial sustainability have not been used in any of these studies to look at corporate governance and financial sustainability globally. Using gender diversity, board meetings, board size, board independence, CEO tenure, CEO remuneration, and audit committee size as explanatory variables, this study has identified the following governance characteristics and investigated how they affect the financial sustainability of manufacturing enterprises.

2.0 Literature review

2.1. Theoretical background of corporate governance and financial sustainability

According to Sulimany et al. (2021) corporate governance is the entire structure and procedure that oversees any organization and ensures that laws and regulations are properly observed. According to Shanikat and Abbadi (2011), governance is meant to handle the institutional framework and offer direction to the management and leadership tasked with carrying out their duties. Corporate governance is the process by which an organization's power is used to maximize the value to its shareholders by combining its entire portfolio (Adegboye et al., 2020; Sulimany et al., 2021; Uchenna, 2020). The connection of various interests, including those of the individual, the corporation, and society, to accomplish the goal of the organization is the essence of corporate governance (Kong et al., 2023; Shanikat & Abbadi, 2011). As such, measures for guaranteeing the sustainability of these MFS should be investigated. Financial sustainability is a capability of an organization to sustain and grow its monetary assets over a long period of time, according to Adegboye et al. (2020). Similarly, Bowman (2011) argues that the financial sustainability of an organization can be defined as the enduring financial adaptability of these organizations, given that they appeal to an important part of the population that has significant financial needs. Financial sustainability, according to Uchenna (2020), is the capacity of an MFS to establish and maintain a varied resource base over an extended period, which would benefit the client public regardless of financial support or donations.

2.1.A Agency theory and stakeholder theory

The connection between financial sustainability and corporate governance is defined through a combination of agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1989) and stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984).

Assuming information asymmetry, opportunistic agent behavior, and principal-agent

(manager-shareholder) conflicts of interest, agency theory provides an explanation for the volatile relationship between stakeholders and managers (Halme & Huse, 1997). Effective Corporate governance, according to agency theory (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002), enhances a company's capacity to adapt to new challenges and decreases agency conflicts. Furthermore, Li et al. (2008) argue that in order to ensure accountability for the actions of agents, the internal governance mechanism must function efficiently. Effective corporate governance improves a company's financial performance and legitimacy (Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2012; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Jo & Harjoto, 2011 Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012) and according to Gul and Leung (2004), more adequately discusses the function of governance in stakeholders' management, with the stakeholders' demand for sustainable corporate development in consideration. Kolk (2008), Ienciu et al. (2012), and Buniamin et al. (2011), among other proponents of agency theory, contend that agency problems can be mitigated through the implementation of effective governance practices that impose constraints on managers. Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) contend, in accordance with stakeholder theory, that effective corporate governance strengthens the bond between a company and its stakeholders through the promotion of corporate sustainability. Stakeholder theory is divided into two branches by Barako and Brown (2008): managerial and ethical.

2.2. Review of prior studies

Chenuos et al. (2014) examined the impact of corporate governance on the financial sustainability of microfinance institutions in Kenya from 2000 to 2011 and employed an explanatory research design to ascertain the cause-and-effect relationship between the financial sustainability (as measured by ROA) of microfinance institutions in Kenya and corporate governance variables (board size, CEO duality, board composition, and CEO gender) and board size had a considerable positive effect on financial sustainability, as did CEO gender; however, CEO duality had a negative impact on financial sustainability. Board composition had a negative effect on financial sustainability.

Mahmood et al. (2018) examined the impact of corporate governance on financial sustainability of the top 100 companies that are publicly traded on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE) between 2012 and 2015 and employed an explanatory sequential mixed methods design and found that CG elements improved disclosures regarding sustainability. A sizeable board size, including a female director, and a corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee (CSRC), improved the ability of management to oversee and regulate decisions concerning sustainability.

Oyewale and Adewale (2014) studied the financial sustainability of eight Nigerian microfinance companies. They used ROA as a measure of sustainability and corporate governance variables such as board size, board diversity, board independence, and management compensation. Their findings revealed that board diversity positively impacts financial sustainability. However, larger and more independent boards may negatively affect financial sustainability.

Shrivastava and Addas (2014) aimed to examine the relationship between financial sustainability of the member firms of the S&P 500 index in the USA and corporate governance. Financial sustainability was estimated using ROA and ROE, whereas institutional ownership, board size, gender diversity, and board composition constituted corporate governance attributes. Descriptive methods and multiple regression were employed in the data analysis. A

significant and positive correlation was discovered between the efficacy of corporate governance and financial sustainability.

Sulimany et al. (2021) investigated whether financial sustainability and sound corporate governance were predictor variables that assisted firms in the food and beverage sector of the Saudi Stock Exchange in maximizing their share prices and using the descriptive statistics, correlation matrices, pooled ordinary least squares and mediation techniques, found that the study indicated that the correlation between shareholder value (share price) and corporate governance (board size) in companies was mediated by financial sustainability.

Tjahjadi et al. (2021) examined the impact of good corporate governance on corporate sustainability performance of the non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) between 2013 and 2017 and the board of commissioners (BOC) and top management team (TMT) used as good corporate governance variables. A multiple regression analysis was utilized to examine the hypotheses under investigation. The magnitude of the BOC influenced financial sustainability performance in a positive way and TMT negatively impacted the financial sustainability performance.

Uchenna (2020) examined the influence of corporate governance on the financial sustainability of Microfinance Institutions in Nigeria from 2011 to 2015 and used ROA and Board size, diversity of genders, and independence of boards were adopted as measures for corporate governance characteristics sustainability evaluation in substitute of OSS. Board independence and gender diversity did not correlate significantly while positive correlation was observed solely between board size and financial sustainability.

2.3. Hypotheses development

2.3.1. Board size and financial sustainability

The dimensions of the board of directors are an essential component of corporate governance that is specific to a particular firm (Dalton & Kesner, 1987). According to the theory of resource dependency, a greater degree of financial sustainability is correlated with a larger board size (Goodstein et al., 1994). Previous studies have established a correlation between the size of the board and its efficiency (Rock et al., 1998). Although there is no universally optimal number of board members, it is beneficial to prevent the assembly from being either overly small or large. To ensure members for meetings, facilitate efficient work completion without placing excessive demands on members, and maintain continuity, it is advisable for a manufacturing firms board to have an adequate size that encompasses a diverse set of expertise, including but not limited to legal knowledge, audit skills, target market comprehension, and social perspective and boards consisting of fewer than seven members, as the majority may be insufficient (Rock et al., 1998; Siele, 2009). Thus, financial sustainability is positively correlated with board size (Sulimany et al., 2021). De Andres et al. (2005) and Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) contend that an increase in the size of the board has an adverse effect on the efficacy of governance. Oyewale and Adewale (2014) posit that a reduction in board size is conducive to financial sustainability. According to Ahmed et al. (2006) and Dey (2008), a reduced board size enhances communication efficiency, which subsequently leads to higher levels of accountability and commitment.

H01: The effect of board size on financial sustainability is not statistically significant, other things remaining constant.

2.3.2. Board independence and financial sustainability

The extent to which board members are independent comes from the board's responsibility to ensure the transparency of management and to address matters concerning external accountability. Board independence is quantified as the proportion of outside directors in relation to the total number of directors (John & Senbet,1998; Rock et al., 1998; Siele, 2009). External board members are regarded as more independent than internal personnel and have a greater ability to monitor the organization's progress (Dalton and Kesner, 1987). The corporate governance code (2018) of the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) mandates that a minimum of 20% of the board of directors must possess independent status. Sulimany et al. (2021) demonstrated that board independence and corporate governance are not significantly correlated. As stated by Oyewale and Adewale (2014), financial sustainability declines when board independence is hampered. The significance of board member independence derives from the fact that it ensures management's responsibility to address external actors and matters related to external accountability and safeguarding the interests of shareholders by ensuring an unbiased decision-making process (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Weisbach, 1988).

H02: The effect of board independence on financial sustainability is not statistically significant, other things remaining constant.

2.3.3. Gender diversity and financial sustainability

The proportion of female directors participating on the board of an organization is the definition of gender diversity (Liao et al., 2014). The effectiveness of the board is generally enhanced by the presence of female CEOs and directors (Kyereboah Coleman & Biekpe, 2005; Mersland & Strom, 2007). Gender diversity on the board, according to Siele (2009), raises demands concerning profitability, efficiency, and value creation. Mersland and Strom (2007) posit that customer acquisition and retention may be aided by a board comprising a significant proportion of women. Consequently, an increased representation of female directors is anticipated to enhance the financial sustainability, and productivity and efficacy of the MFS. Additionally, gender composition is a crucial factor in corporate board organization design (Adams & Ferreira, 2004; Siele, 2009). Board diversity and corporate sustainability mechanisms do not exhibit a statistically significant correlation (Badin & Dabor, 2015; Hussain et al., 2020; Sulimany et al., 2021). Mahmood et al. (2018), Alakeci and Al-khatib (2006), and Oyewale and Adewale (2014) all assert that board diversity enhances financial sustainability.

The ratio of women serving on corporate boards is substantially and positively correlated with return on assets, which is a metric used to assess the sustainability of a company (Mahmood et al., 2018).

H03: The effect of gender diversity on financial sustainability is not statistically significant, other things remaining constant.

2.3.4. Board meetings and financial Sustainability

Board meetings are frequently employed as essential for board diligence and activity (Laksmana 2008; Vafeas 1999).Board meetings signify the effectiveness of the board, which promotes greater oversight of a company's activities and encourages businesses to enhance transparency (Lipton and Lorsch 1992). A few studies, including those by Frias-Aceituno et al. (2013) and

Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010), find a negative correlation between the number of annual board meetings and corporate sustainability. A lack of significant correlation has been identified between board meetings and corporate governance mechanisms (Hussain et al., 2020; Sulimany et al., 2021). Contrary conclusions have been reached in other research efforts, including that of Giannarakis (2014) concerning sustainability disclosure of companies and Karamanou (2005) and Vafeas (2005) concerning transparency, with respect to the number of board meetings and sustainability performance.

H04: The effect of board meetings on financial sustainability is not statistically significant, other things remaining constant.

2.3.5 CEO tenure and financial sustainability

The performance of a firm can be influenced by the tenure of the CEO, which can have both positive and negative effects, contingent upon the CEO's life cycle seasons (Millerand & Shamsie, 2001). Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) proposed the Leader life cycle theory, which posits an inverted relationship between the tenure of a CEO and the financial sustainability of a company. Five phases of a CEO's tenure have been documented: "response to mandate," "experimentation," "selection of an enduring theme," "convergence," and "dysfunction." This theory posits that the initial stages of a CEO's tenure are characterized by performance improvements as a result of learning, openness, and a high level of task interest. Nevertheless, performance begins to decline approximately six years later as the CEO's dedication to an outdated paradigm increases, and task interest and information sources progressively diminish (Hambrick et al., 1993). Several empirical investigations support this perspective (Henderson et al., 2006; Miller & Shamsie, 2001). In contrast, exceptionally long CEO tenures in a dynamic environment lead to a heightened commitment to an obsolete paradigm and more restricted information processing (Hambrick et al., 1993; Hambrick & Fuku-tomi, 1991). It is reasonable to anticipate that a dynamic environment would induce alertness; however, in this instance, it is more probable that a CEO will develop an attachment to a paradigm that is no longer suitable, which will lead to performance deficits. This may be the case in the event of a sudden change in technologies, competitor behavior, or consumer behavior.

H05: The effect of CEO tenure on financial sustainability is not statistically significant, other things remaining constant.

2.3.6 CEO remuneration and financial sustainability

The question of the impact of CEO remuneration on the financial sustainability and performance of the firm has been the subject of numerous studies; however, the results are wildly inconsistent. Belliveau et al. (1996), Brick et al. (2005), and Ozkan (2007) discovered a robust and positive relationship between these two variables, while Johnson (1982), Finkelstein and Boyd (1998), and Tosi et al. (2000) found no relationship. This paper will endeavor to ascertain whether there is any correlation between the compensation of CEOs in Sweden's largest firms, financial sustainability, and the performance of those firms, in accordance with the findings of previous research. Ozkan (2007) posits that the performance of a company is positively correlated with the compensation of its CEO (at least in the United Kingdom). According to the findings, the relationship is only positive for cash compensation; however, it becomes less significant when total pay is taken into account. Conversely, Brick et al. (2005) conducted a study that demonstrates a robust negative correlation

between the performance of a company and the remuneration of its CEO. They discover that when the organization is substantial, the CEO and directors indulge in cronyism and receive compensation regardless of the organization's performance.

H06: The effect of CEO remuneration on financial sustainability is not statistically significant, other things remaining constant.

2.3.7 Audit committee size and financial sustainability

All listed companies are required to have an audit committee in accordance with the Corporate Governance Code of Bangladesh (Khan et al., 2013). Muttakin et al. (2015) discovered that family dominance in the board results in nearly 50% of listed companies lacking an audit committee. Nevertheless, the revised corporate governance code has been emphasized by the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) as requiring the establishment of an audit committee with a minimum of three members (BSEC, 2018). The magnitude of the audit committee has been found to have a significant positive effect on the financial sustainability and performance of the firm (Al-Matari et al., 2014; Alqatamin, 2018). The audit committee must be composed of professionals with expertise in professional accounting and finance, as it serves as the initial line of defense for the Board's characteristics and audit committee and ensures organizational transparency through financial statements (BSEC, 2018). The firm's performance is significantly positively influenced by the magnitude of the audit committee, as determined by Al-Matari et al. (2014). Therefore, the inclusion of non-executive directors in the audit committee is also regarded as a mechanism for guaranteeing the firm's accountability and wealth maximization.

H07: The effect of audit committee size on financial sustainability is not statistically significant, other things remaining constant.

3.0 Research gap

There has been little investigation on the relationship between company financial sustainability and corporate governance; the majority of studies have focused on developed nations and other developing countries, such as Nigeria and Kenya. Regarding the association between corporate governance and the financial sustainability of corporations, no research has been conducted in Bangladesh. Additionally, it is marked from the literature reviewed above that the majority of previous research employed static models, disregarded the dynamic characteristics of the data, and employed aggregated or fixed effect estimators, and neglected the influence of macroeconomic variables in favor of focusing solely on firm-specific variables (e.g., Uchenna, 2020; Wintoki et al., 2012). Given the fluctuating character of the relationship between financial sustainability and governance, as well as the existence of other possible sources of endogeneity, this study states by employing a dynamic panel data GMM approach to examine the correlation between corporate governance elements and the financial sustainability of manufacturing firms listed on the DSE. The research takes place over an extended period of time and employs data from a representative sample of these firms, in addition to firm-specific and macroeconomic variables.

4.0 Research methodology

Ex post facto is the research design implemented and the secondary data is obtained from the annual financial reports of the firms that have been selected. The sample employed in this research is acquired via random sampling method. Specifically, 109 manufacturing firms that have been listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange Limited for a period of ten years, from 2013 to 2022. In

addition to this, the information related to macroeconomic variables is obtained from a database maintained by the World Bank. Consequently, STATA 14 is used for this analysis. Among the numerous industries that are represented, the following are selected for this study.

Table 1: Summary of the selected firms and percentage of samples

Name of sector	No. Of firms listed	No. Of firms used	Percentage of Sample selected
Cement	7	5	71.4%
Ceramic	5	3	60%
Engineering	42	19	45.3%
Food & Allied	21	9	43%
Fuel & Power	23	15	65.3%
Pharmaceuticals &	33	17	51.5 %
Chemicals	58	28	48.24%
Textiles	6	2	33.33 %
Paper & Printing	6	4	66.67%
Tannery	15	7	46.67%
Miscellaneous	216	109	50.47%
Total			

Source: DSE in 2024

The non-manufacturing characteristics of the following are considered exclusion criteria: (i) financial institutions; (ii) corporate bonds; (iii) debentures; (iv) mutual funds; and (iv) treasury bonds issued by existing corporations and governments.

4.1 Variables measurement

Table 2: Catalogue of the variables

Variable	Mnemonics	Role	Measurement	Authors
Return on Asset	ROA	Dependent	Net Income / Total Assets.	(Sulimany et al., 2021; Uchenna, 2020)
Return on Equity	ROE	Dependent	Net Income / Total Equity.	(Kola Benson & Ganda, 2022)
Operational Self-Sufficiency	OSS	Dependent	Operating Income / Total financial Expense + Loss on Expense + Operating Expense.	(Uchenna, 2020)
Financial Self-Sufficiency	FSS	Dependent	Financial Income / Total Financial Expense + Loss on Expense + Operating Expense.	Researcher Own Authorship

Variable	Mnemonics	Role	Measurement	Authors
Board Size	BS	Independent	Total Number of Members on the Board of Directors.	(Sulimany et al., 2021; Oyewale & Adewale 2014; Uchenna, 2020)
Board Independence	BI	Independent	Independent Directors / Total Directors.	(Mahmood et al., 2018b; Sulimany et al., 2021; Uchenna, 2020)
Board Diversity	BD	Independent	Women on the Board of Directors/ Total Directors.	(Mahmood et al., 2018; Uchenna, 2020)
CEO Remuneration	CEOREM	Independent	Remuneration of the CEO as a Natural Logarithm	(Brick et al., 2005; Ozkan (2007)
Board Meetings	BM	Independent	Number of Annual Board Meetings	(Hussain et al., 2020; Sulimany et al., 2021).
Audit Committee Size	AUCS	Independent	Number of Members in the Audit Committee	(Al-Matari et al., 2014; Alqatamin, 2018).
Firm Size	FS	Control	Natural Logarithm of the Whole Asset	(Oyerogba et al., 2024; Tjahjadi et al., 2021)
Leverage	LV	Control	Total Debt / Total Equity	(Oyerogba et al., 2024; Tjahjadi et al., 2021)
Growth Opportunity	GOP	Control	(Total Asset Current Year- Total Asset Base Year) / Total Asset Base Year	(Molla et al., 2021)
Liquidity	LQ	Control	Current Asset / Current Liability.	(Bhunia et al., 2011; Farhan et al., 2019; Vahid et al., 2012)
GDP Growth Rate	GDPR	Control	(GDP Rate Current Year - GDP Rate Base Year) / GDP Rate Base Year	(Molla et al., 2021)
Inflation Rate	INF	Control	The Rate of Annual Inflation	(Molla et al., 2021)
Interest Rate	INT	Control	The Nominal Annual Interest Rate	(Molla et al., 2021)

4.2 Endogeneity results

Endogeneity is defined in a technical sense as the correlation between an error term (e) and a predictor variable (x) in a regression model (Ullah et al., 2018). To ascertain the endogeneity of the regressors deemed endogenous in a simultaneous equation model, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test of Endogeneity is implemented.

Table 3: Endogeneity test

Variables	Model 1 (ROA)		Model 2 (ROE)		Model 3 (OSS)		Model 3 (FSS)	
	P>f value	Remarks	P>f value	Remarks	P>f value	Remarks	P>f value	Remarks
BS	.94	Negative	.847	Negative	.04	Positive	.005	Positive
BI	.97	Negative	.756	Negative	.023	Positive	.001	Positive
BD	.41	Negative	.297	Negative	.16	Negative	.85	Negative
BM	.53	Negative	.615	Negative	.58	Negative	.63	Negative
CEOREM	.0001	Positive	.0001	Positive	.0001	Positive	.001	Positive
CEOT	.0009	Positive	.046	Positive	.218	Negative	.35	Negative
AUCS	.032	Positive	.024	Positive	.986	Negative	.08	Negative
FS	.0009	Positive	.045	Positive	.218	Negative	.35	Negative
LQ	.0639	Negative	.209	Negative	.76	Negative	.61	Negative
GOP	.482	Negative	.666	Negative	.38	Negative	.84	Negative
LV	.5096	Negative	.392	Negative	.24	Negative	.75	Negative
RGDP	.482	Negative	.67	Negative	.38	Negative	.84	Negative
INF	.345	Negative	.43	Negative	.45	Negative	.0001	Positive
INT	.370	Negative	.32	Negative	.401	Negative	.545	Positive

Source: Authors' calculation

Endogenous variables for the model ROA and ROE include the size of the audit committee, the tenure of the CEO, the size of the firm, and the remuneration of the CEO. Nevertheless, the endogenous variables for model OSS are board size, board independence, and CEO remuneration, while for model FSS, they are board size, board independence, CEO remuneration, and inflation rate.

4.3 Model specification

We apply the work of Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bond (1991)'s general dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model to investigate the impact of corporate governance on the organization's financial sustainability. It capitalizes on our explanatory variables' underlying dynamic interactions.

In this context, the subsequent equation may be derived:

$$CFS_{it}=\alpha_{0+}\delta CFS_{it-1+}\beta_{it}CG_{+}Xn_{it+}\mu_{it+}\epsilon_{it} \quad (i)$$

CFS_{it} represents the corporate financial sustainability of the firm, as assessed in this research through the application of ROA, ROE, OSS, and FSS. The prior year firm's corporate financial sustainability is represented by CFS_{it-1}; the primary repressors (variables associated with corporate governance) are denoted by $\beta_{it}CG$; control variables are denoted by Xn_{it}; firm-specific fixed effects are represented by $\pm\mu_{it}$; the error term is symbolized by ϵ_{it}; the individual firm is denoted by i; and the time period by t.

The following specific models are estimated for the purpose of this investigation using the equation (j) presented above.

$$ROA_{it} = \alpha_0 + \delta_1 ROA_{it-1} + \beta_2 BS_{it+} \beta_3 BI_{it+} \beta_4 BM_{it} + \beta_5 BD_{it} + \beta_6 CEOREM_{it+} \beta_7 CEOT_{it} + \beta_8 AUCS_{it} + \beta_9 FS_{it} + \beta_{10} LQ_{it} + \beta_{11} GOP_{it+} \beta_{12} LV_{it+} \beta_{13} RGDP_{it} + \beta_{14} INF_{it+} \beta_{15} INT_{it+} \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

$$ROE_{it} = \alpha_{0+} \delta_1 ROE_{it-1} + \beta_2 BS_{it+} \beta_3 BI_{it+} \beta_4 BM_{it} + \beta_5 BD_{it} + \beta_6 CEOREM_{it} + \beta_7 CEOT_{it} + \beta_8 AUCS_{it} + \beta_9 FS_{it} + \beta_{10} LQ_{it} + \beta_{11} GOP_{it} + \beta_{12} LV_{it} + \beta_{13} RGDP_{it} + \beta_{14} INF_{it} + \beta_{15} INT_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

$$OSS_{it} = \alpha_{0+} \delta_1 OSS_{it-1} + \beta_2 BS_{it+} \beta_3 BI_{it+} \beta_4 BM_{it} + \beta_5 BD_{it} + \beta_6 CEOREM_{it} + \beta_7 CEOT_{it} + \beta_8 AUCS_{it} + \beta_9 FS_{it} + \beta_{10} LQ_{it} + \beta_{11} GOP_{it} + \beta_{12} LV_{it} + \beta_{13} RGDP_{it} + \beta_{14} INF_{it} + \beta_{15} INT_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

$$FSS_{it} = \alpha_{0+} \delta_1 FSS_{it-1} + \beta_2 BS_{it+} \beta_3 BI_{it+} \beta_4 BM_{it} + \beta_5 BD_{it} + \beta_6 CEOREM_{it} + \beta_7 CEOT_{it} + \beta_8 AUCS_{it} + \beta_9 FS_{it} + \beta_{10} LQ_{it} + \beta_{11} GOP_{it} + \beta_{12} LV_{it} + \beta_{13} RGDP_{it} + \beta_{14} INF_{it} + \beta_{15} INT_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (4)$$

In our dataset, the OLS model is inappropriate for addressing the potential correlation between explanatory variables and unobserved effects due to endogeneity, first-order autocorrelation, and heteroskedasticity (Ullah et al., 2018). In line with prior research (Arellano & Bond, 1991), we employed the system-generalized method of moments (SGMM) two-step estimator to assess our hypotheses and account for endogenous, bias-corrected standard errors, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation when estimating model parameters and predetermined explanatory variables. The effective reduction of these causes of dynamic endogeneity may be achieved by implementing the internal data transformation process and incorporating the lagged values of dependent variables into the System GMM. This method is significantly more efficient and is compatible with a greater variety of instruments than the alternative estimator of difference GMM (Roodman, 2009; Wooldridge, 2009). Roodman (2009) asserts that the estimator in question is impartial, consistent, and does not exclude fixed effects. Since the standard covariance matrix is adaptable in two-step GMM estimation for panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, this paper employs the two-step robust command rather than the one-step approach. The instruments' validity in the GMM study is verified at the conclusion of the analysis using the Hansen J test for over-identifying restrictions and the Arellano–Bond AR (2) test for autocorrelation.

4.4 Empirical results

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
ROA	1090	6.131	4.475	-8.4	24.78
ROE	1090	8.319	5.053	-14.59	26.78
OSS	1090	6.329	2.503	-8.4	18.23
FSS	1090	5.829	3.012	-8.9	18.28
BS	1090	11.71	4.457	4	27
BD	1090	.093	.061	0	.45
BI	1090	.167	.06	0	.57
BM	1090	9.275	6.255	3	58
CEOREM	1090	6.686	.6	5.201	8.981
CEOT	1090	12.061	9.132	1	48
AUCS	1050	3.774	.876	3	9
FS	1090	9.714	.655	7.2	11.654
LQ	1090	1.826	1.398	.013	9.186
GOP	1090	11.771	47.866	-8.99	1234
LV	1090	1.257	17.163	.035	567
RGDP	1090	6.5	1.151	3.45	7.88
INF	1090	6.051	.663	5.51	7.53
INT	1090	8.961	5.939	-8.13	13.87

Source: Authors' calculation

The summary statistics for the variables used in this analysis are shown in Table 4. The average number of directors is 11.71, with 16 percent being independent directors and 0 independent directors as a minimum. However, the minimum number of independent directors is .00, which indicates that some of the firms in the sample do not comply with the corporate governance (CG) guidelines (2012). According to these regulations, a company must have at least one-fifth of its board members as independent directors. If the total number of directors is less than fifteen, then at least three of them must be independent. There is an average of 9.3 percent female directors on board, with a standard deviation of 6.1% and a range of 0 to 45%. According to Sussmuth-Dyckerhoff et al. (2012), this number is higher than that of the other Asian areas (6%), although Catalyst figures (2012) show that it is 6.9% in Singapore and 8.5% in China. The mean number of board meetings is 9.27, while the standard deviation is 6.2 and there were between 58 and 3 for board meetings. CEO tenure and remuneration have an average of 12.0 and 6.6, respectively, with standard deviations of 9.13 and .6. Executive compensation values vary from 5.2 to 8.9, and CEO tenure spans from 1 to 48 years. With a mean of 3.77 and a standard deviation of 0.876, the audit committee's size varies from 3.00 to 9.000.

The range for ROA is -8.4 to 24.78, with an average of 6.13 and a standard deviation of 4.47; the corresponding value for ROE is 8.31 with a standard deviation of 5.05 and the mean OSS of 6.3 is characterized by a standard deviation of 2.50. Since the average OSS value in this case is greater than 1 (100%), businesses have achieved operational sustainability, which is a stand-in for corporate financial sustainability (Tehulu, 2013; Tehulu, 2022). There is a standard deviation of 3.012 and an average FSS of 5.829. Here, the enterprises achieve financial sustainability as shown by the mean FSS value of more than 1 (110%) (Fonchamnyo et al., 2023).

Table 5: Pairwise correlations matrix

Variables	ROA	ROE	OSS	FSS	BS	BD	BI	BM	CEOREM	CEOTEN	AUCS	FS	LQ	GOP	LV	RGDP	INF	INT
ROA	1.000																	
ROE	0.887	1.000																
OSS	0.088	0.067	1.000															
FSS	0.314	0.259	0.177	1.000														
BS	0.043	0.040	0.097	0.114	1.000													
BD	-0.009	-0.008	0.022	-0.022	-0.057	1.000												
BI	0.000	-0.004	-0.06	-0.098	-0.080	-0.015	1.000											
BM	-0.018	-0.017	0.021	-0.027	-0.064	0.947	-0.013	1.000										
CEOREM	-0.111	-0.113	-0.04	-0.089	0.059	0.125	-0.026	0.122	1.000									
CEOT	0.125	0.111	0.013	0.052	0.173	0.119	0.011	0.147	-0.053	1.000								
AUCS	0.012	0.023	-0.01	0.025	0.065	-0.050	-0.043	-0.07	0.210	-0.179	1.000							
FS	-0.18	-0.139	-0.001	-0.06	0.078	0.247	-0.004	0.241	0.298	-0.185	0.146	1.000						
LQ	0.060	0.043	0.001	0.006	0.094	0.000	-0.043	0.009	-0.037	0.011	0.016	-0.085	1.000					
GOP	0.020	0.010	0.033	0.048	0.036	0.041	-0.012	0.041	-0.016	0.088	0.014	-0.026	-0.033	1.000				
LV	-0.004	-0.013	-0.03	-0.006	0.022	-0.030	-0.004	-0.029	-0.016	0.003	0.040	-0.015	0.158	-0.03	1.0			
RGDP	-0.020	-0.011	-0.02	-0.014	0.027	0.015	0.017	-0.005	-0.009	0.014	0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.045	0.01	1.0		
INF	-0.024	-0.035	-0.03	0.040	-0.564	0.008	0.032	0.005	-0.068	-0.094	-0.104	-0.123	-0.007	-0.02	-0.01	-0.09	1	
INT	0.027	0.021	-0.01	0.002	-0.029	-0.011	0.004	-0.01	-0.010	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004	0.009	0.001	-0.01	-0.20	.145	1

Source: Authors' calculation

The correlation between the variables in the study is illustrated in Table 5. The financial sustainability of a company, as assessed by ROA, ROE, OSS, and FSS, is positively correlated with the size of its board. The financial sustainability of a company is negatively correlated with board diversity and board meetings, as determined by ROA, ROE, and FSS, however, they have a positive correlation with OSS. The financial sustainability of a company is negatively correlated with board independence, as determined by ROE, OSS, and FSS and positively correlated with ROA. The financial sustainability of a company, as assessed by ROA, ROE, OSS, and FSS, is negatively correlated with the remuneration of the CEO. The financial sustainability of a company, as assessed by ROA, ROE, OSS, and FSS, is positively correlated with the tenure of its CEO. The financial sustainability of a company is positively correlated with the size of its audit committee, as determined by ROA, ROE, and FSS, as well as with OSS.

Table 6: Two-step system GMM model output

Variables	Model 1 (ROA)	Model 2 (ROE)	Model 3 (OSS)	Model 4 (FSS)
Return on Asset$_{(t-1)}$	.7234***(.0822)			
Return on Equity$_{(t-1)}$		.6934***(0.0845)		
Operational Self-Sufficiency$_{(t-1)}$			.7812***(0.7845)	
Financial Self-Sufficiency$_{(t-1)}$				.5456***(0.1029)
Board Size	-.0292(.0256)	-.0143(.0314)	.0214(.0204)	.0674***(.0225)
Board Independence	.4623(1.2234)	-.4245(1.8123)	-.6114(.6943)	-2.2456**(1.156)
Board Meetings	-.5834(.3552)	-.0224(.0152)	-.0032(.0072)	-.008(.0253)
Board Diversity	64.3452*(37.6345)	2.82**(1.5334)	1.7734**(.9556)	-.137(2.5623)
CEO Remuneration	-.3913**(.1974)	-.5122***(.2082)	-.1493*(.0873)	-.1792(.2243)
CEO Tenure	.0262***(.0091)	.028***(.0102)	-.0012(.0044)	.0005(.0103)
Audit Committee Size	-.0274(.1264)	.0413(.1384)	.0063(.0595)	-.0194(.1034)
Firm Size	-.3283*(.1933)	-.1434(.2134)	-.0174(.0723)	-.0623(.2322)
Liquidity	.1341**(.0572)	.0973(.0624)	.0564***(.0274)	.0312(.0543)
Growth Opportunity	-.0007(.0014)	-.0006(.0012)	.0005***(.0002)	.0044(.0045)
Leverage	-.0006(.0009)	-.0012(.0013)	-.014***(.0012)	-.0003(.0009)

Variables	Model 1 (ROA)	Model 2 (ROE)	Model 3 (OSS)	Model 4 (FSS)
GDP Growth Rate	-.1433*(.0792)	.0012(.0822)	-.0112(.0503)	.0172(.0574)
Inflation Rate	-.2784(.1555)	-.1634(.1812)	.1024(.1523)	.4374***(.1203)
Interest Rate	.0084(.01564)	.0076(.0234)	.0052(.0181)	.0024(.0144)
Constant	9.4122***(3.1345)	7.8345***(3.3134)	1.5245(1.7423)	1.1766(1.7523)
Sargen test (p value)	6.5623(.1612)	1.3134(.2534)	1.7934(0.6145)	11.3645(.0456)
Hansen Test (p value)	4.8534(.3034)	.9634(.3273)	3.3823(.3364)	9.0456(.1073)
AR (1) Test (p value)	-3.5334***(.0002)	-5.1***(0.0001)	-3.82***(0.0004)	-4.38***(0.0004)
AR (2) Test (p value)	-2.2223(.0856)	-1.5(.13445)	.13(.8935)	-1.09(.2746)
Groups/ instruments	109/15	109/27	109/15	109/34
Number of observation	981	981	981	981
Year effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prob > F	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Source: Authors' calculation

The findings of a two-step system GMM estimation are displayed in this table. Standard errors for robustness are enclosed in brackets around the coefficients. At the 1%, 5%, and 10% significant levels, the indications of ***, **, and *, respectively, denote statistically significant values.

The results of the two-step GMM approach for financial sustainability and corporate governance characteristics are presented in Table 6. The results indicate that the financial sustainability of the current year is significantly correlated with that of the year immediately preceding it for all models. The size of the board has a positive effect on financial sustainability, as measured by FSS. Suharyono et al. (2023) conducted a recent study that supports this result, which indicates a positive correlation between the size of the board and the financial sustainability of a firm. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that there is no correlation between board size and financial sustainability is confirmed by the absence of a statistically significant relationship between board size and ROA, ROE, and OSS. The only statistically significant negative relationship with FSS is the board's independence. The presence of board independence does not exhibit a statistically significant relationship with the other financial sustainability measurement variables, such as ROA, ROE, and OSS. We exclude and verify our previously formulated hypothesis, which supports the assertion that board independences do not have a statistically significant impact on financial sustainability. This suggests that an increase in the number of nonexecutive directors in Bangladeshi firms cannot contribute to their economic value. This discovery provides confidence to the research findings (Pham et al., 2021; Anh and Anh, 2020). The financial sustainability, as assessed by ROA, ROE, OSS, and FSS, has not been significantly affected by board meetings. The results are not consistent-

with the conclusions of the studies conducted by Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) and Frias-Aceituno et al. (2013), which establish an inverse relationship between the sustainability and the quantity of annual board meetings. Nevertheless, the absence of statistical significance in the impact of board meetings on ROA, ROE, OSS, and FSS corroborates the hypothesis that there is no correlation between board meetings and financial sustainability. This research is consistent with the findings of Hussain et al. (2020) and Sulimany et al. (2021), which conclude that there is no statistically significant relationship between the meetings of the board and financial sustainability. Additionally, our research indicates that the financial sustainability of a company is positively influenced by the diversity of its board, as measured by ROA, ROE, and OSS. This discovery corroborates the research conducted by Mahmood et al. (2018), Alakeci and Al-khatib (2006), and Oyewale and Adewale (2014), which establishes a significant positive correlation between the financial sustainability of corporations and the diversity of their boards. The hypothesis that we had previously formulated is not supported by this result. However, the influence of board diversity on FSS is negligible. Sulimany et al. (2021) and Hussain et al. (2020) also obtained similar conclusions, indicating that there is no correlation between the diversity of corporate boards and financial sustainability. This outcome is comparable. CEO remuneration has a statistically significant negative impact on financial sustainability, as measured by ROA, ROE, and OSS, and there is no correlation with FSS. This suggests that the financial sustainability is adversely affected by the CEO's significant compensation. The company may experience financial difficulties at times; however, the CEO is compensated a significant amount to ensure their retention, thereby demonstrating to investors that the company has a highly reputable and well-known CEO. The hypothesis that we had previously formulated is not supported by this result. The findings of other authors, such as Belliveau et al. (1996), Brick et al. (2005), and Ozkan (2007), which established a positive correlation between the remuneration of CEOs and financial sustainability, are contradicted by the results. The findings of (Hambrick & Fukutomi 1991) are contradicted by the results of our research that posits a positive correlation between financial sustainability as measured by ROA and ROE and the tenure of the CEO. The hypothesis that we had previously formulated is not supported by this result. Nevertheless, this underscores the necessity for established CEOs to have a say in decisions regarding capital structure, firm financing, and overall expenses. They strengthen their position and make the appropriate decision for the company as a consequence of their increased compensation and appealing incentives. Nevertheless, the tenure of the CEO is not associated with OSS and FSS. There is no correlation between the magnitude of the audit committee and financial sustainability, as determined by ROA, ROE, OSS, and FSS. This conclusion suggests that the firm's leverage and financial sustainability cannot be directly influenced by the effective regulation and oversight of directors and managers when the audit committee is large. Furthermore, we are aware that a well-functioning and efficient audit committee can improve the company's performance and reduce the likelihood of fraud, conflicts of interest, and agency fees. The results are not indicative of the findings of other authors (Al-Matari et al., 2014; Alqatamin, 2018). In the context of control variables, financial sustainability is statistically significant in the case of ROA and is adversely affected by firm size. Growth opportunity has a positive effect on

financial sustainability, and liquidity exerts a statistically significant influence on ROA and OSS, thereby nurturing a positive correlation. This effect is statistically significant for both the OSS and financial sustainability. Nevertheless, financial sustainability is negatively correlated with leverage; however, this correlation is only significant for OSS. In the same vein, financial sustainability is negatively correlated with GDP growth; however, this correlation is only significant for ROA. It appears that there is no correlation between financial sustainability and interest rates. The inflation rate and financial sustainability are positively correlated, but only for FSS.

5.0 Conclusion

An empirical investigation has been done to examine the influence of corporate governance characteristics on the financial sustainability of the firms. Our research results show that financial sustainability is impacted positively by board size, as measured by FSS, and indicate that the effectiveness of corporate monitoring, control, communication, and decision-making processes is enhanced with increasing board size. Therefore, the influence of board size on ROA, ROE, and OSS is not statistically significant. The independence of non-executive directors on a board does not impact financial sustainability and indicates that simply having external directors on the board does not ensure that firms will achieve greater financial sustainability or that agency conflicts between shareholders and management will be reduced. One argument may be that independent directors have been chosen from unrelated backgrounds or that they lacked the expertise to question the executive authority. Regarding the financial sustainability evaluation, board meetings have no significant effect on ROA, ROE, OSS and FSS and this indicates directors' performance will undoubtedly be limited as more frequent meetings serve as an indication of their ineffectiveness. Financial sustainability is impacted positively by board diversity as measured by ROA, ROE, and OSS and indicates that an increased representation of female directors is anticipated to enhance financial sustainability, productivity, and efficacy. Despite this, FSS is not significantly impacted by board diversity. The results indicate that in order to prevent a recurrence of financial irregularities and loan scams in the Bangladeshi manufacturing sector, policymakers, regulatory bodies, and firm management should place greater emphasis on the institutions' overall corporate governance structures, particularly concerning the appointment of independent and female directors who can challenge the executive power and ensure that board meetings are conducted effectively. CEO remuneration has a statistically significant negative impact on financial sustainability, as measured by ROA, ROE, and OSS, and there is no correlation with FSS. This suggests that the financial sustainability is adversely affected by the CEO's significant compensation. The company may experience financial difficulties at times; however, the CEO is compensated a significant amount to ensure their retention, thereby demonstrating to investors that the company has a highly reputable and well-known CEO. The results of our research posit a positive correlation between the financial sustainability as measured by ROA and ROE and the tenure of the CEO. This underscores the necessity for established CEOs to have a say in decisions regarding capital structure, firm financing, and overall expenses. There is no correlation between the magnitude of the audit committee and financial sustainability, as determined by ROA, ROE, OSS, and FSS. This conclusion suggests that the firm's leverage and financial sustainability cannot be directly influenced by the effective regulation and oversight of directors and

managers when the audit committee is large.

The expansion of macro-objectives and the maintenance of economic progress in Bangladesh necessitate additional consideration and effort in the area of corporate governance.

To construct a resilient manufacturing sector that can ultimately achieve sustainable development objectives, regulatory bodies should also ensure that businesses strictly adhere to corporate governance principles. An in-depth examination is conducted of the correlation between corporate governance characteristics and financial sustainability. However, our findings are limited to large corporations, which possess greater financial resources for investing in sustainability undertakings and are capable of implementing more vigilant governance mechanisms in comparison to smaller enterprises. Variations in outcomes may arise when examining smaller and medium-sized enterprises. Additional research methodologies, such as survey and case study approaches, may yield comprehensive understandings as well as facilitate a deeper examination of the underlying connections. Incorporating additional components of corporate governance could serve as an additional path for future research.

Although the corporate governance metrics examined in this study are essential, other proxy variables—including CEO duality, ownership concentration, and board composition—may also significantly impact the financial sustainability of a corporation.

It is therefore suggested that different corporate governance indicators be the focus of future research. An interesting field of inquiry may pertain to the function of nomination of directors on boards. Additionally, interesting details may be uncovered through the incorporation of management variables, such as the employment of the board's finance director and the professional experiences of senior executives. Additional financial institutions, such as banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and investment companies, may be the subject of future research regarding corporate financial sustainability and corporate governance management.

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